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FREE INTERNATIONAL  TRADE rests on the principle  of comparative  advan- 
tage. By engaging  in trade, a nation  can benefit  from specializing  in the 
production  of goods  in  which  it is relatively  more  efficient  and  exchanging 
them  for those in which other nations  excel. Provided  its cost levels are 
appropriately  adjusted  by exchange  rate  changes  or monetary  flows, the 
nation  will be sufficiently  competitive  to pay for its import  needs. Over 
time, comparative  advantage  may shift, however, and in principle  an 
economy might lose its comparative advantage in an entire sector. 
Indeed, it is widely believed that  the U.S. manufacturing  sector is in the 
process of just  such a decline-developed  countries have become 
increasingly  competitive with U.S. firms  at the upper  end of the tech- 
nology  spectrum  while  developing  countries  have  penetrated  the  markets 
of those firms  making  more standardized  products. 
The perceived effect of international  competition  has grown to the 
point that it is frequently  cited as the major  source of structural  change 
in the U.S. economy and the primary  reason for the declining  share of 
manufacturing  in U.S. employment.  This shift  of U.S. production  away 
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from  manufacturing  is viewed with some alarm,  both because manufac- 
turing  activity is considered intrinsically  desirable  and because of the 
perceived adjustment  costs associated  with this shift. In addition,  some 
argue that this decline in U.S. comparative  advantage  does not result 
from  an inevitable  process of technological  diffusion  or from  changes  in 
factors of production,  but rather  from the industrial  and trade  policies 
adopted  by other nations. Without  similar  policies, some contend that 
the United States will eventually  become a nation  of farm  products  and 
services-'  a nation  of hamburger  stands." 
Before adopting  policies based on these perceptions,  it seems useful 
to take a careful  look at the evidence. International  trade  is certainly  not 
the only source of structural  change  in the U.S. economy. At least five 
factors  have had  important  effects on the U.S. industrial  base. First, the 
share of manufactured  products in consumer spending has declined 
secularly  because of the pattern  of demand  associated with rising  U.S. 
income levels. Second, some of the long-run  decline in the share of 
manufacturing  in total employment reflects the relatively more rapid 
productivity growth in this sector. Third, because the demand for 
manufactured  goods is highly sensitive to the overall growth rate of 
GNP, manufacturing  production  has been slowed disproportionately  by 
the sluggish  overall  economic growth  in the global  economy since 1973. 
Fourth, shifts in the pattern  of U.S. international  specialization  have 
arisen  from  changes in comparative  advantage  that, in turn,  result  from 
changes in relative factor endowments and production capabilities 
associated with foreign  economic growth  and policies. And fifth, short- 
run changes in U.S.  international  competitiveness have come from 
changes in exchange rates and cyclical conditions both at home and 
abroad. 
The appropriate  choice of policies depends  crucially  on the ability  to 
evaluate the relative impacts of these various factors on current  U.S. 
industrial  performance.  If the slow rate of U.S. industrial  growth  is the 
inevitable result of world economic development, changes in interna- 
tional  comparative  advantage,  or the post-1973  world  economic  malaise, 
special strategies to deal with such developments  might  be needed. If 
policies under the current world trading system are the reason, the 
United States might  try  to change  that  system or its own behavior  within 
it. If exchange  rate  changes  are  important,  factors  such as the monetary- Robert Z. Lawrence  131 
fiscal mix of policy or exchange-rate  intervention  policies might merit 
attention. If transitory  cyclical forces are the cause, there might  be no 
need for a new industrial  policy but rather  a change  in macroeconomic 
policies or an acknowledgment  that the slump brought  on by current 
policies is the unavoidable  cost of reducing  inflation. 
In this paper  I concentrate  on the effects of trade  on employment  and 
value added in manufacturing  over the medium  run. I use input-output 
analysis to distinguish shifts due to manufacturing  trade from other 
sources of change. I report on estimates for fifty-two manufacturing 
industries,  for the manufacturing  sector in the aggregate,  and  for sectors 
aggregated  by production  process. I look briefly  at developments  of the 
past two years. But the sample period  for most of the analysis ends in 
1980,  partly  for reasons of data  availability  and  partly  because I seek to 
emphasize  the major  structural  change in U.S. industrial  performance 
without having the data unduly affected by the recent recessions and 
exchange  rate  changes. 
Given  the radical  changes  in the world  economy  after  1973,  the period 
from 1973 to  1980 is  the most relevant sample for current policy 
discussions. The data for this period measure  U.S. performance  in the 
new international  environment  that is marked  by stagflation,  volatile 
exchange  rates, and increasing  government  intervention  in trade;  and it 
is during  this period, it is alleged, that foreign industrial  policies have 
damaged  the U.S. manufacturing  base. 
Observations  for the 1973  to 1980  period, however, may be unduly 
influenced  by the different  cyclical positions prevailing  in the endpoint 
years. Because capacity  utilization  in manufacturing  was similar  in 1970 
and 1980, data for the entire decade are used to provide a second, 
cyclically neutral, measure of structural  changes.1 Observations  for 
1970-80  are still influenced  by changes in the real exchange rate of the 
dollar  in these years. As measured  by the International  Monetary  Fund, 
relative U.S. export prices for manufactured  goods were 13.5 percent 
lower in 1980  than  in 1970.  In evaluating  the results, therefore,  it should 
be kept in mind that the U.S.  trade performance  during the 1970s 
depended  in part  upon  this price-adjustment  process. 
1. Capacity  utilization  in U.S. manufacturing,  measured  by the index  of the Federal 
Reserve  Board,  was 79.3 percent  in 1970  and  79.1 percent  in 1980. 132  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
Foreign Trade and U.S. Manufacturing  Output and Employment 
A separation  of the effects on the economy of foreign trade and 
domestic forces  begins with the identity P  =  U  +  X  -  M, where P is 
production  of goods; U, domestic use (consumption,  government  pur- 
chases, and investment including inventories); X,  exports; and M, 
imports. 
Using  this identity  and  data  on total  production,  exports,  and  imports, 
any change in production can be decomposed into a change due to 
domestic use and a change due to the foreign trade balance. But to 
estimate the impact of a change in one of the right-hand  variables  on 
individual domestic industries, or even its net impact on domestic 
production,  the induced  effects of that  change  must  be estimated. 
When  an airplane  is exported  from  the United States, for example, it 
embodies  inputs  such as aluminum,  tires, computers,  and so forth  from 
a wide variety  of other industries.  Similarly,  when an import  replaces  a 
domestic product, it reduces the demand in domestic manufacturing 
sectors that produce  inputs  for the affected domestic product.  In some 
cases, the induced  effects even change  the allocation  of total  value  added 
between  domestic  and  foreign  sources. For  instance,  an  increase  in some 
chemical  exports  will require  an  increase  in  imported  oil as a raw  material 
so that the net effect on total domestic production  is less than  the value 
of the export. A complete accounting of the impact of trade should 
incorporate  these indirect  effects. 
The indirect  effects of trade are estimated  using the 1972  eighty-five 
sector input-output  (1-0) table. Data on manufacturing  output,  exports, 
and imports  for 1970, 1972, 1973, and 1980, available  at the four-digit 
Standard  Industrial  Classification  (SIC) code level, are converted into 
1972 dollars and arranged  to correspond with the industrial  coding 
structure  of the fifty-two  1-0 manufacturing  sectors used in this paper.2 
Next the input-output  table  is used to estimate  direct  and  indirect  output 
requirements.  Based on these requirements,  estimates  are then made  of 
the proportions  of total  value  added  in each industry  that  could  be related 
2. I used the concordance  provided  by the Department  of Commerce.  See "Industry 
Classification  of the 1972 Input-Output  Tables," Survey of Current  Business, vol. 59 
(February  1979),  p. 54. Robert Z. Lawrence  133 
to (1)  all manufactured  goods exports, (2)  manufactured  goods estimated 
to be displaced  by all manufactured  goods imports,  and  (3)  as a residual, 
the proportion  of value added related to domestic use. Employment 
effects are estimated  under  the assumption  that productivity  growth  in 
the exports  and  domestic  products  of each industry  are  identical,  so that 
the allocation of employment to exports, imports, and domestic use 
corresponds  to the allocation of value added. Because suitable trade 
deflators  are not available,  data  on the current  value  of imports,  exports, 
and output for each industry  are deflated  with the output deflators  for 
each industry.3 
Several  limitations  of this  analysis  should  be noted.  This  is an  exercise 
with ex post data rather  than a simulation  with a full-scale behavioral 
model. Thus when the model relates growth  to domestic use, exports, 
and imports, it neither explains why the configurations  occurred nor 
accounts for possible behavioral interactions  among the endogenous 
variables.4  For example, growing  competition  from imports  may have 
forced domestic producers  to lower their prices. Consumption  of both 
domestic products and imports might have increased as a result, but 
such effects are not examined.  With  the exception  of modifications  that 
were made to reflect changes in imported inputs, the input-output 
coefficients necessarily allow for no substitution  possibilities among 
inputs and no change in input requirements  over time.' Furthermore, 
among  products,  the analysis  assumes  that  final  demands  always substi- 
tute between particular  imports  and the output  of the domestic industry 
that  manufactures  products  similar  to those imports  rather  than  products 
3. I implicitly  assume  a unitary  elasticity  of demand  when applying  this procedure  to 
measure  the import-competitive  effects. 
4. One  attempt  to incorporate  such  interactions  is Gene  M. Grossman,  "The  Employ- 
ment  and  Wage  Effects  of Import  Competition  in the United  States," Working  Paper  1041 
(National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  1982). 
5.  For  each year  the input-output  matrix  has  been  adjusted  to account  for  imports  used 
as intermediate  inputs.  All industries  are  assumed  to use imports  as intermediate  inputs  in 
the same  ratio  as the entire  economy  does. For  example,  if imports  account  for 10  percent 
of the domestic  use of steel, it is assumed  that  the automobile  industry  uses imports  for 10 
percent of its steel needs. If one defines mi as the ratio of imports  to domestic use of 
industry  i and r,j  as the total requirement  coefficient  of commodity  i for final  demand  of 
commodityj,  then  for  each  year  studied,  one  can  construct  a "total  domestic  requirements" 
matrix by replacing r1j  with (1 -  m*)  r1j  if i $&  j and with 1 +  (1 -  mi)(r,j  -  1) if i = j. 134  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
of some other industry.6  Finally, any years chosen as the basis for 
comparison  are likely to have some peculiar  characteristics  that could 
affect the conclusions of the analysis. Accordingly,  whenever  possible, 
comparisons  are reported  for a number  of different  periods. 
Table 1 shows estimates  of value added  and  employment  due to trade 
and  domestic use in U.S. manufacturing  for 1970,  1972,  1973,  and 1980.7 
One can compare 1980 and 1970, years with similar levels  of  ca- 
pacity utilization in manufacturing.  In 1970, value added related to 
manufacturing  exports was 8.5 percent  of overall  value added  in manu- 
facturing,  while the production  of manufactured  imports  at home would 
have raised  value added  in manufacturing  by 8.3 percent. By 1980  these 
shares  had  grown  considerably-to 15.1  for  exports  and  14.4  for  imports  .8 
Thus for the period from 1970 to 1980 the trade balance raised value 
added in manufacturing  (in 1972 dollars) by half a percentage point. 
Although net value added due to trade was $0.6 billion in 1970, it 
amounted  to $2.6 billion in 1980 (both measured  in 1972  dollars). The 
positive contributions  of trade  for 1972-80  and 1973-80  are even larger. 
Because products  making  up U.S. manufacturing  imports  have lower 
output per worker when produced  in the United States than products 
making  up U.S. exports, net  jobs relating  to trade  were negative  in each 
year in table 1. However, though  there  was a decline of 10,000  jobs due 
6.  For  discussions  of the methodological  issues associated  with  exercises such  as this 
see  Walter S.  Salant,  The Effects  of Increases  in Imports on Domestic  Employment: A 
Clarification  of Concepts, Special Report 18 (Washington,  D.C.: National  Commission 
for Manpower  Policy, 1978);  and Charles  S. Pearson, "Trade  Employment  and Adjust- 
ment," (Ottawa:  Institute  for Research  on Public  Policy, forthcoming). 
7. There have been a number  of studies similar  to this with somewhat different 
emphases.  Krueger  estimates,  for example,  that  between 1970  and 1976  the average  two- 
digit  industry  experienced  an annual  decline  in  job opportunities  resulting  from  increased 
imports  of about  0.37 percent.  See Anne 0.  Krueger,  "Protectionist  Pressures,  Imports, 
and  Employment  in  the United  States," Working  Paper461  (National  Bureau  of Economic 
Research,  1980),  p. 20. 
Baldwin  has  decomposed  employment  by industry  into  two parts:  an  effect  attributable 
to income  elasticities  at  home  and  abroad,  and  a second  competitiveness  effect,  attributable 
to changes  in relative  prices  and  other  factors. See Robert  E. Baldwin  and  others, "U.S. 
Policies in Response to Growing  International  Trade Competitiveness,  Final Phase I 
Report"  (University  of Wisconsin,  Center  for Research  on U.S. Trade  Competitiveness, 
1982),  appendix  A. 
8. The 15.1  percent  for exports  is somewhat  higher  than  the estimate  of 13.7  percent 
for  employment  directly  and  indirectly  related  to exports  published  by the Census  Bureau. 
See U. S. Bureau of the Census,  1980 Annual Survey of Manufactures: Origin of Manufac- 
tured  Exports,  M80  (AS)-6  (January  1982). Robert Z. Lawrence  135 
Table 1.  Value Added and Employment  in U.S. Manufacturing  Due to Foreign 
Trade and Domestic Use, Selected Years, 1970-80a 
Item  1970  1972  1973  1980 
Value added  (billions  of 1972  dollars) 
Total  262.7  295.3  318.9  349.5 
Foreign  trade  0.6  -5.3  -3.3  2.6 
Exports  22.4  24.0  30.1  52.9 
Imports  -21.8  - 29.3  - 33.4  - 50.4 
Domestic use  262.1  300.7  322.2  347.0 
Employment  (millions) 
Total  19.34  19.10  20.11  20.24 
Foreign  trade  - 0.05  -0.45  -0.34  -0.06 
Exports  1.57  1.45  1.78  2.93 
Imports  -  1.62  -  1.91  - 2.12  - 2.98 
Domestic use  19.38  19.56  20.45  20.30 
Addenda 
Percentage  due to exports 
Value added  8.5  8.1  9.4  15.1 
Employment  8.1  7.6  8.8  14.5 
Percentage  due to imports 
Value added  - 8.3  -9.9  -  10.5  -  14.4 
Employment  - 8.4  -10.0  -  10.5  -  14.7 
Sources: Author's  calculations  using data from U.S. Department  of Commerce,  Bureau  of Economic  Analysis, 
input-output  tape;  Bureau  of Industrial  Economics,  data base for manufacturing  output,  exports,  and imports;  and 
U.S. Department  of Labor,  Bureau  of Labor  Statistics,  employment  and earnings  tape, 
a. Estimates  of direct and indirect  requirements  based on the input-output  table were used to calculate  the 
proportion  of value added  related  to manufactured  exports  and to manufactured  goods displaced  by imports.  Value 
added  related  to domestic  use was calculated  as a residual  and employment  allocated  to foreign  trade  and  domestic 
use in proportion  to value  added  in each two-digit  1-0 industry. 
to trade  between 1970  and 1980,  trade  raised  the number  ofjobs in U.S. 
manufacturing  by 390,000  from 1972  to 1980,  and by 280,000  from 1973 
to 1980.  These increases can be compared  with the corresponding  total 
rise  in  employment  in  manufacturing  of 1.14  million  (1972-80)  and  130,000 
(1973-80), respectively. 
It is certainly hard to reconcile these findings  with the widespread 
notion  that  foreign  trade  had  a major  negative  effect upon  U.S. industrial 
employment  in the 1970s. This perception  can be explained  in part by 
the inappropriate  use of statistics and in part by the disproportionate 
attention commanded by a few large industries, especially steel and 
automobiles. Those seeking to denigrate  U.S. manufacturing  prowess 
generally  point  to the declining  U.S. share  in global  manufactured  goods 
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manufactured  exports  from  developed  market  economies declined  from 
17.4 percent to 15.4 percent. This measure  is obviously inappropriate, 
however, for the purposes  of this analysis. For employment  the data  on 
U.S. manufactured  trade  volumes  are  more  germane:  the volume  of U.S. 
manufactured  exports increased by 101.5 percent from 1970 to 1980, 
whereas  manufactured  imports  increased  only 72.0 percent.9 
Several  real devaluations  of the dollar  in the 1970s  were important  in 
determining  these trade  flows. Empirical  evidence linking  trade  flows to 
relative  price changes has caused some controversy.  Those claiming  to 
find no relation between the two generally seek a contemporaneous 
response.  10 Statistical  studies that look for lags over periods  of at least 
three years find sizable effects.11  Thus, claims to the contrary  notwith- 
standing,  the U.S. performance  reflects  the sensitivity  of trade  flows to 
changes in relative prices. Between 1970  and 1980  there was a marked 
improvement  in U.S. relative  price competitiveness  that took the form 
of a real depreciation of the U.S.  dollar. The real increase in the 
9.  United  Nations, Monthly  Bulletin  of Statistics, vol. 36 (December  1982),  pp. xxiv- 
xxv. By contrast,  the increase  in volumes of manufactured  exports  in Japan,  Germany, 
and all developed countries from 1970 to  1980 was  155.7, 71.0, and 90.3 percent, 
respectively. 
10. In a prominent  study published  by GATT (General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and 
Trade),  Blackhurst  and  Tumlir  argue  that  real  exchange  rates  have not had  the predicted 
effects on trade  balances.  They conclude:  "In general,  only by invoking  long  lags-often 
of two years or more-between exchange  rate  change  and  the initial  impact  on the trade 
balance  would  it be possible  to salvage  even partially  the conventional  view." See Richard 
Blackhurst  and Jan Tumlir,  "Trade  Relations  under  Flexible Exchange  Rates," GATT 
Studies  in International  Trade,  8 (Geneva:  General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and  Trade,  1980), 
p. 27. 
11. See Michael C. Deppler and Duncan M. Ripley, "The World Trade Model: 
Merchandise  Trade," IMF Staff Papers, vol. 25 (March 1978), pp. 147-206;  Rudiger 
Dornbusch  and Paul Krugman,  "Flexible Exchange  Rates in the Short  Run," BPEA,  3: 
1976, pp. 537-75; Helen B. Junz and Rudolf  R. Rhomberg,  "Price Competitiveness  in 
Export  Trade  among  Industrial  Countries,"  American  Economic  Review, vol. 63 (May 
1973,  Papers and Proceedings, 1972),  pp. 412-18;  Stephen  P. Magee, "Prices, Incomes, 
and Foreign Trade,"  in Peter B. Kenen,  ed., International  Trade and Finance: Frontiers 
for Research (Cambridge  University  Press, 1975),  pp. 175-252;  Mordechai  E. Kreinin, 
"The  Effect  of Exchange  Rate  Changes  on the Prices  and  Volume  of Foreign  Trade,"  IMF 
Staff Papers, vol. 24 (July 1977),  pp. 297-329;  Irving  B. Kravis,  Robert  E. Lipsey, and 
Dennis  M. Bushe, "Prices  and  Market  Share  in  International  Machinery  Trade,"  Working 
Paper  521  (National  Bureau  of Economic  Research,  1980);  and  Raymond  Fair,  "Estimated 
Effects of Relative Prices on Trade Shares," Working  Paper 696 (National  Bureau  of 
Economic  Research,  1981). Robert  Z. Lawrence  137 
manufacturing  trade balance can be ascribed, in part, to the effects of 
the dollar  devaluations  in 1971, 1973,  and 1978-79.12 
A Disaggregated  Analysis 
Although  much of the discussion about U.S. deindustrialization  has 
been about  manufacturing  as a whole, the discussion  in fact corresponds 
to developments in just a few industries. Tables A-1 and A-2 in the 
appendix  present  disaggregated  data  on value added  and  employment  to 
illustrate  this. Some results in those tables may appear  paradoxical.  In 
particular,  if employment  due to trade  in an industry  is initially  negative, 
indicating  that  imports,  on balance,  are  displacing  morejobs  than  exports 
are creating,  then a labor-saving  change  in value added  or productivity 
will expand employment  due to trade  by bringing  it nearer  to zero.  13 
The employment  shifts reported  in table A-2 for 1970-80  reveal sev- 
eral  features. First, in a majority  (thirty-one  of the fifty-two)  of the U.S. 
industrial  sectors employment  growth  was positive; employment  due to 
trade  also grew in thirty-one  1-0 sectors. Second, generally  the effects 
of trade  on employment  were smaller  than  those due to domestic  use: in 
forty-two  of the fifty-two  sectors the change  due to trade  was smaller  in 
absolute magnitude  than the change due to domestic use. Third,  trade 
was not the reason  for the drop  in employment  in most of the declining 
industries.  In six of the nine industries  in which employment  fell more 
than 10 percent employment due to trade actually increased; only in 
footwear and apparel  was the loss due to trade  greater  than  that due to 
domestic use. Similarly,  employment  due to trade  increased  in fourteen 
of the twenty-one industries  in which overall employment  fell: only in 
three industries-radio and television, motor vehicles, and miscella- 
neous manufacturing-was a decline  due to trade  larger  than  an increase 
due to domestic use. 
From 1973 to 1980 the positive influence of trade was even more 
widespread-employment due to trade rose in thirty-eight  of the fifty- 
12. Price  sensitivity  is the major  source  of the decline  in the U.S. manufacturing  trade 
balance  from 1980  to 1982. 
13. Because  of productivity  changes,  the changes  in value  added  in any sector  may  be 
in the reverse direction  from the corresponding  changes  in employment.  If value added 
per employee rises by x percent, value added must rise by x percent simply to keep 
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two sectors considered. However, overall employment declined in 
twenty-five  of the sectors, primarily  because of domestic use. In none 
of the  industries  in  which  total  employment  declined  was a positive  effect 
due to domestic use offset by a negative effect due to trade. Although 
trade contributed  to the employment  loss in seven of the twenty-five 
sectors, the decline due to trade was larger than the decline due to 
domestic  use in only footwear  and  miscellaneous  manufacturing. 
For the decade as a whole, an interval  over which cyclical variations 
in demand  were unimportant,  the automobile  industry  is virtually  the 
only industry  whose experience fits the widely held view that employ- 
ment declines were due to trade and that without trade, employment 
would have grown. Even in automobiles, as the International  Trade 
Commission  confirms,  the major  sources of the industry's  problems  are 
domestic. As reported  in table A-1, of the 24.1 percent decline in the 
output  of the U.S. automobile  industry  from 1973  to 1980, 18.6  percent 
could be attributed  to a decline in domestic use and 5.5 percent to 
changes  in the net trade  balance.  Even if Japanese  imports  had  remained 
constant  during  this period, the problems  faced by the U.S. automobile 
industry  and its suppliers would have been severe. A relative rise in 
wages in the automobile industry and the impact of regulation  have 
raised  relative  prices of U.S. automobiles.14 Furthermore,  the increase 
of gasoline prices, fears of gas shortages-and,  after 1979, high real 
interest rates and depressed cyclical conditions-have  further sup- 
pressed  the demand  for cars. 
The role of domestic use in reducing  demand  is even greater  in the 
steel industry  than in automobiles.  The domestic use of iron and steel 
lowered output  from 1970  to 1980  by 2.7 percent;  from 1973  to 1980,  by 
23.0 percent. Clearly even if foreign trade had not reduced domestic 
steel output  by a total  of 3.4 percent  between 1970  and 1980,  these would 
have been difficult  times for the U.S. steel industry.  From 1973  to 1980 
net foreign trade partially  offset-by  0.5 percent-the  decline in U.S. 
output  due to domestic use.  15 
14. Had  imported  automobiles  retained  their  1980  share  in the U.S. automobile  market 
in  the  first  half  of 1982,  for  example,  only  a  fifth  of the U.  S. automobile  workers  unemployed 
since 1980  would  have retained  their  jobs. 
15. My measures  of the effect due to trade  include  the indirect  effects of trade  in other 
products  besides steel. Thus an important  source  of the output  gains  from  trade  for steel 
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Despite smaller  changes  due to trade  than  those due to domestic  use, 
public perceptions may be exaggerating  the role of trade because the 
effects of trade and domestic use have been positively correlated.  For 
reasons unrelated  to international  trade,  the U.S. manufacturing  sector 
has been undergoing  major  structural  shifts in output  and employment 
because of domestic  demand  and  technology.  The impact  of trade  has in 
some cases reinforced  these domestic  changes;  in other  cases, industries 
experiencing  employment  losses because of domestic  use have had  only 
minor  offsets as a result of trade. This correspondence  between trade 
and domestic use is apparent  at the relatively  disaggregated  level of the 
fifty-two  1-0 industries.  From  1973  to 1980,  for  example,  there  was a 0.49 
correlation  between the contributions  to value added of domestic use 
and  those of foreign  trade. 
The correspondence  between growth related to domestic use and 
growth  related  to trade  can be seen clearly  when the fifty-two  industries 
are aggregated  according  to the nature  of the production  process. In the 
trade  literature  it is customary  to group  goods into three groups:  goods 
that require the relatively intensive use of natural  resources (termed 
Ricardo goods), goods that require high proportions  of research and 
development  or employ scientists  and  engineers  fairly  intensively  (prod- 
uct-cycle or high-technology goods), and goods that use relatively 
standardized  production  technologies (Hecksher-Ohlin  goods). In this 
paper  I adopt  the Ricardo  (resource-intensive)  and  product-cycle  (high- 
technology)  groupings  and divide the Hecksher-Ohlin  group  according 
to relative capital-labor  ratios into capital- and labor-intensive  cate- 
gories.  16 
The data in table 2 highlight  the change in the composition  of U.S. 
output and employment  in manufacturing.  They indicate the long-run 
shift toward high-technology  sectors in both output and employment. 
The employment  shift proceeded at about  the same pace between 1970 
and 1980  as during  the previous  decade, although  the shift measured  by 
value added accelerated somewhat. But from 1973 to 1980 the shift 
16. The ratio  of employment  to gross capital  stock in 1976  at the three-digit  SIC level 
was used to divide  the Hecksher-Ohlin  group.  The detailed  classification  scheme  used by 
Stern  and  Maskus  has been matched  with  the fifty-two  1-0 categories  as indicated  in table 
A-3 of the appendix.  See Robert  M. Stern and Keith E. Maskus, "Determinants  of the 
Structure of U.S.  Foreign Trade, 1958-76, " Journal of International Economics,  vol.  11 
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Table 2.  Shares of Value Added and Employment  in U.S. Manufacturing, 
by Production  Characteristics  of Industries, Selected Years, 1960-80 
Percent 
Item  1960  1970  1972  1973  1980 
Value addeda 
High-technology  27  31  31  32  38 
Capital-intensive  32  30  31  32  27 
Labor-intensive  13  13  14  13  12 
Resource-intensive  28  25  24  23  23 
Employment  b 
High-technology  27  30  28  29  33 
Capital-intensive  29  29  30  30  28 
Labor-intensive  21  20  21  21  19 
Resource-intensive  23  21  21  20  20 
Sources:  Same as table  1. 
a.  Value added computed  for each  input-output (1-0)  industry by multiplying gross  output in 1972 dollars by the 
ratio of value added to output in the  1972 1-0  table. 
b.  Employment  is  derived  from the  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics  series  on  employment  and earnings.  The  series 
have been aggregated to the two-digit  1-0  industry and then to the process  categories. 
toward high technology accelerated  by both measures. In the thirteen 
years from 1960  to 1973,  the share of high-technology  products  in total 
value added  increased  from 27 to 32 percent. In the next seven years it 
rose from 32 to 38 percent. The acceleration  in employment  share in 
high-technology  sectors is even more  dramatic;  after  increasing  from  27 
percent  in 1960  to 29 percent  in 1973,  it rose to 33 percent  by 1980. 
Table 3 breaks down the striking  divergence  of the high-technology 
sector from the rest of manufacturing  into the parts accounted for by 
domestic use and  foreign  trade.  Between 1973  and 1980,  output  of high- 
technology  products  increased  by 30.6 percent  and  employment  rose by 
15.7  percent;  in industries  characterized  by other  production  processes, 
output grew sluggishly and employment  declined. The compositional 
changes were related  to growth  resulting  from both trade  and domestic 
use. Although  most of the employment  growth in the high-technology 
sector  can be ascribed  to the rise in domestic  use, growth  in employment 
from  foreign  trade  was greater  in this sector than in any other. Foreign 
trade also raised employment in resource-intensive  industries, where 
domestic demand  was sluggish. Stagnant  or falling domestic demand, 
combined with a reinforcing  decline in net foreign demand, thwarted 
growth  in both capital-  and labor-intensive  industries.  In the following 
sections I turn to more detailed explanations  for the behavior of the 
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Table 3.  Percentage  Change in Value Added and Employment 
in U.S. Manufacturing  Due to Foreign Trade and Domestic Use, 
by Production  Characteristics  of Industries, 1970-80 and 1973-8Oa 
1970-80  1973-80 
Domestic Foreign  Domestic Foreign 
Item  Total  use  trade  Total  use  trade 
Value  added 
Total  33.1  32.3  0.8  9.6  7.8  1.9 
High-technology  61.9  54.7  7.2  30.6  25.2  5.4 
Capital-intensive  18.4  22.2  - 3.8  - 7.3  - 6.7  -0.6 
Labor-intensive  16.5  20.7  -4.1  -2.1  -0.2  -  1.9 
Resource-intensive  23.4  22.6  0.8  10.7  8.2  2.5 
Employment 
Total  4.7  4.7  0.0  0.7  -0.7  1.4 
High-technology  16.4  12.9  3.5  15.7  11.1  4.6 
Capital-intensive  0.3  2.3  -  1.9  - 6.0  -5.9  -0.1 
Labor-intensive  -  1.8  1.8  - 3.6  - 8.2  - 6.3  - 2.0 
Resource-intensive  0.5  - 0.6  1.1  -  1.5  -4.1  2.6 
Sources:  Same as table  1. 
a.  See  notes  to tables  I and 2. 
Patterns  of Domestic  Use: High Technology  and Demand 
Looking at the detailed data on industries and the product aggregation, 
one  is  struck by  the  degree  to which  most  of the  story  of  structural 
change can be told simply by looking at the data on domestic use. 
Output due to domestic  use was weakest  in old U.S.  industries such 
as tobacco,  wood  containers,  leather goods,  iron and steel,  and metal 
containers.  The sectors with the highest increases in domestic use were 
all high-technology  sectors.  From 1970  to 1980  several of these industries 
had increased  output due to greater domestic  use: for example,  output 
in office,  computing,  and accounting  machines  increased  253 percent; 
electronic  components,  219 percent;  optical  equipment,  123 percent; 
and plastics,  90 percent. Of the high-technology industries, only aircraft 
had a negative effect due to domestic use. Thus the patterns associated 
with  the  performance  of  U.S.  industrial growth  in the  1970s are all 
present  in the data on domestic  use:  considerably  more rapid output 
gains  in high-technology  and equipment  industries,  relatively  slower 
growth in all major process  and end-use categories  in the 1970s, partic- 
ularly sluggish performance in U.S.  labor- and capital-intensive  indus- 
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tobacco products, and metal products. Almost all these developments 
have been reinforced  by the impact of foreign competition, although 
their directions  and general  magnitudes  would be the same without  the 
effects due to foreign  trade. 
Explanations  of the accelerated  shift  toward  high-technology  produc- 
tion since 1972  often cite the influence  of foreign  trade or a speedup  in 
the pace of technological change. But neither of these explanations 
seems sufficient. As shown in table 3, the accelerated shift is present 
even when the effects of trade  are excluded. Thus  trade  is certainly  not 
all of the story. As for faster technological  change, table 4 shows that 
employment, output, and productivity  (output  per employee) in high- 
technology  industries  grew more slowly from 1973  to 1980  than  they did 
in the 1960s.  In fact, as measured  by the growth  in output  per employee, 
the slowdown in productivity  growth  in the high-technology  industries 
has been quite similar  to the productivity  slump  elsewhere in manufac- 
turing. This makes it doubtful  that faster technological change is the 
explanation. 
What  other  explanations  might  account  for  the relatively  strong  output 
gains in high-technology  products during 1973-80? One might be the 
relatively  high income-elasticity  of demand  for these products  and the 
low income-elasticity  of demand  for older commodities. Wealthy  con- 
sumers  devote declining  shares of their  incomes to basic needs such as 
clothing, footwear, furniture, and simple electrical appliances. Con- 
versely, they increase the share devoted to computers, aircraft, and 
communications  equipment.  Thus, with the expansion  of income, basic 
commodities can be expected to have declining  shares. But if income 
elasticities have the dominant effect,  the share of  high-technology 
industries increases more rapidly in periods of high rather than low 
income  growth.  17 
Perhaps, however, it is precisely because income effects were so 
small during the  1973-80 period that the share of high-technology 
products has grown. In explaining the demand for a product, it is 
customary to distinguish  between income and substitution  effects. In 
the absence of price declines, because their qualitative  nature  changes 
very little, the market  for standardized  commodities  will only expand  in 
17. If, for example, income  growth  rates were infinite,  commodities  with elasticities 
of less than 1.0 would  tend  to have zero shares;  if growth  were zero, shares  would  remain 
constant.  Thus the more  rapid  is the growth  rate, the faster the shares  of products  with 
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Table 4.  Growth of Employment, Value Added, and Productivity  in U.S. 
Manufacturing,  High- and Low-Technology  Goods, Selected Periods, 1960-82 
Average  annual  growth  rates, in percent 
Item  1960-70  197040  197340  198042 
Employment 
High-technology  2.5  1.5  2.1  -2.4 
Low-technology  1.0  0.0  -0.8  -4.2 
Value addeda 
High-technology  5.7  4.9  3.9  n.a. 
Low-technology  3.2  1.8  0.0  n.a. 
Productivityb 
High-technology  3.1  3.4  1.7  n.a. 
Low-technology  2.2  1.9  0.8  n.a. 
Sources:  Same as table  1. 
n.a.  Not available. 
a.  In 1972 dollars. 
b.  Value added divided by employment. 
the face of income  growth.  Thus  under  depressed  cyclical  conditions  the 
demand  for the products  of U.S. industries  such as textiles, iron, steel, 
other basic metals, fabricated  metals, and automobiles  will be particu- 
larly sluggish. Income growth is likely to be less important  as a deter- 
minant  of the demand  for a new product.  It might  be possible to increase 
sales of Sony Walkman  radio-earphone  sets in the midst  of a recession, 
for example, whereas it is not possible to raise the sales of portable 
radios. Substitution  effects due to price  and  quality  changes  are  likely  to 
dominate  income effects. 
With  the correct  hedonic measures, all quality  changes theoretically 
can be appropriately  recorded as relative price changes. In reality, 
however, such adjustments  are not made, so it is reasonable  to decom- 
pose substitution  effects into those due to price changes and those due 
to quality  changes. If the relatively more rapid  productivity  growth  in 
high-technology products resulted in relatively lower prices, and if 
demand  were elastic, this could account  for the growth  in employment. 
My use of the deflators  at the four-digit  SIC  level to estimate  the relative 
value-added  changes of the end-use categories failed to confirm  this 
hypothesis. When compared  with the overall rise in value added for 
manufactured  goods, the natural resource industries had increases 
of 49 percent in relative unit value added from 1972  to 1980, but both 
capital-intensive  and  high-technology  products  declined  about  9 percent 
each and labor-intensive  products, 15  percent. Thus one is left with the 
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tional measurement  practices account for the resilience in demand  for 
high technology.18  A second source of substitution  effects during  this 
period  could  of course  be the demand  for  more  energy-efficient  products. 
The close correspondence  between the high-technology  and  equipment 
groupings  suggests  this possibility  (see table  A-3). 
The Role of U.S. Trade 
The Hecksher-Ohlin  theory of trade predicts that an economy will 
specialize in the production of commodities requiring  the relatively 
intensive  application  of its more  abundant  factors  of production.  Empir- 
ical applications of the theory have been moderately successful in 
explaining  the composition of U.S. trade at particular  points in time. 
U.S.  trade surpluses are in commodities made with relatively abun- 
dant  factors of production-land (food)  and skilled  and  highly  educated 
labor  (chemicals, capital  goods, and services); U.S. trade  deficits  are in 
commodities made with unskilled  labor (nondurable  consumer  goods) 
or requiring  resources  that  have been depleted  (fuels).  It is more  difficult 
to  identify the contribution of physical capital in calculating U.S. 
comparative  advantage.19  As Branson  has observed, "Physical capital 
plays a more  neutral  role, combining  relatively  more  with  human  capital 
in exports and unskilled  labor [and  natural  resources]  in imports.  Good 
examples  may  be chemicals  on the export  side and  consumer  electronics 
[and  steel] on the import  side."20 
The theory also helps explain  changes  in U.S. specialization  patterns 
18. This argument  is compatible  with  Martin  Neil Baily's point  that  events since 1973 
have led to the premature  retirement  of capital. See "Productivity  and the Services of 
Capital  and  Labor,"  BPEA, 1: 1981,  pp. 1-67. 
19. The debate about the role of capital  goes back as far as Leontief's famous 1953 
article, which found the United States exporting  goods embodying  labor  and importing 
goods embodying  capital.  See Wassily  W. Leontief, "Domestic  Production  and Foreign 
Trade: The American Capital Position Reexamined," Proceedings of the American 
Philosophical  Society, vol. 97 (Philadelphia:  1953),  pp. 332-49. Surveys of subsequent 
efforts  to explain  Leontief's  findings  are  found  in James  C. Hartigan,  "The United  States 
Tariff  and Comparative  Advantage,  A Survey  of Method," Weltwirtschaftliches  Archiv, 
vol. 117,  no. 1 (1981),  pp. 65-109. See also Robert  M. Stern, "Testing  Trade  Theories," 
in Kenen, International  Trade and Finance,  pp. 3-50. 
20. See William  H. Branson, "Trends  in U.S. International  Trade  and Investment 
since  World War II,"  in Martin Feldstein,  ed.,  The American  Economy  in Transition 
(University  of Chicago  Press, 1980),  p. 236.  For  a comprehensive  survey  of general  studies 
on this subject  see Stem, "Testing  Trade  Theories." Robert Z. Lawrence  145 
over time. As foreign  economies have grown  more  rapidly  than  the U. S. 
economy and as they generally  have had higher  ratios  of investment  to 
GNP, the U.S. share  of the global  capital  stock has declined  markedly. 
However, the U.S. share  of skilled  labor  has decreased  relatively  little, 
and  its share  of global  arable  land  has  actually  increased.21  These changes 
in  relative  factor  endowments  are  therefore  consistent  with  the increased 
U.S. specialization  in products that are intensive in skilled labor and 
land  and  the decreased  specialization  in capital-intensive  products.22 
A less formal  but more dynamic  explanation  of the pattern  of U.S. 
trade  incorporates  the role of changes in technological  and production 
capabilities  and the growth  of economies of scale that accompanied  the 
convergence  of foreign nations  toward  U.S. productivity  levels. In the 
early 1950s  the United States dominated  global  manufacturing  capacity. 
In 1950  the United  States  produced  about  60  percent  of the manufactured 
goods  output  in  the Western  industrial  countries,  and  in 1953  it accounted 
for about 29 percent of the world exports of manufactured  goods. In 
almost every field U.S.  firms stood at the technological frontier and 
enjoyed the economies of scale resulting  from access to a large, inte- 
grated, and extremely wealthy market. American  inventors designed 
products primarily  with a view toward saving labor, and as foreign 
productivity  levels increased  and  real  wages rose these products  became 
increasingly  attractive  abroad. World  War II stimulated  technological 
advances in computers, aircraft,  and pharmaceuticals,  and although  it 
severely crippled civilian production  facilities abroad, in the United 
States the capital  stock remained  intact. 
The shortage  of foreign  manufacturing  capacity  can be inferred  from 
the surpluses  in the U.S. balance  of trade  in all major  end-use  categories 
in 1950,  including  those in which the United States had deficits before 
the war.23  Industrialization  abroad  boosted the U.S. balance  of trade  in 
21. Bowen  has calculated  that  the U.S. share  of global  supplies  of capital  has  declined 
(from  42 percent  in 1963  to 33 percent  in 1975),  while  the share  of skilled  labor  declined  by 
much  less (from  29 to 26 percent),  and its world share  of arable  land actually  increased 
(from  27 to 29 percent).  See Harry  P. Bowen, "Shifts  in the International  Distribution  of 
Resources  and the Impact  of U.S. Comparative  Advantage,"  forthcoming  in Review of 
Economics  and Statistics. 
22. Stern  and  Maskus  report  that  in a series  of annual  regressions  explaining  trade  the 
coefficient  on unskilled  labor  becomes increasingly  statistically  significant  over time and 
the coefficient  on capital,  increasingly  negative.  See Stern  and  Maskus,  "Determinants  of 
the Structure  of U.S. Foreign  Trade,  1958-76." 
23. See William  H. Branson  and  Helen B. Junz, "Trends  in U.S. Trade  and  Compar- 
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capital goods and chemicals, but by the late 1950s the rebuilding  of 
Europe and the expansion of Japanese exports of textiles eroded the 
trade  surpluses  in semimanufactured  goods and consumer  products.  In 
the mid-1960s  foreign steel and automobiles  were penetrating  the U.S. 
market  in substantial  quantities,  and  the trade  balances  in semimanufac- 
tured  products  and  automobiles  became  negative.  As U.S. imports  from 
the developed nations moved up the technology spectrum,  the devel- 
oping  nations  began  to enter the market  and make  up increasing  shares 
of U.S. imports  of standardized  labor-intensive  consumer  products. 
On the one hand, the range  of U.S. imports  broadened  to mirror  the 
different stages of development of its trading partners-with  labor- 
intensive  imports  originating  in developing  nations  and  capital-intensive 
and high-technology  products originating  in the industrial  economies. 
On the other hand, the range  of U.S. exports narrowed,  and it became 
increasingly  confined  to capital  goods, chemical and agricultural  prod- 
ucts, and services. 
In the 1970s  this process of U.S. specialization  continued.  The trade 
between developing nations and the United States evolved along the 
lines of comparative advantage associated with factor endowments 
related to different stages of development. However, production  and 
technological  capabilities  of foreign industrial  countries  converged to- 
ward  those of the United States, and  those countries  now compete with 
U.S. firms in high-technology  products.24  The U.S. market  no longer 
provides American  firms  with unique  opportunities  for realizing  econ- 
omies  of scale.25  Indeed,  foreign  innovations  that  were  directed  primarily 
toward saving raw materials (small automobiles, for example) have 
become increasingly  attractive  to American  consumers.26 
24. For a detailed  analysis  of U.S. trade  in high-technology  products  see C. Michael 
Aho and  Howard  F. Rosen, "Trends  in Technology-Intensive  Trade,"  Economic  Discus- 
sion Paper  11  (Office  of Foreign  Economic  Research,  U.S. Department  of Labor, 1980); 
Jack Baranson  and Harald  B. Malmgren,  "Technology  and  Trade  Policy: Issues and an 
Agenda  for Action," paper  prepared  for the Bureau  of International  Affairs,  Department 
of Labor,  and  the Office  of the U.S. Trade  Representative  (Washington,  D.C.: 1981);  and 
Sumiye Okubo, "The Impact  of Technology  Transfer  on the Competitiveness  of U.S. 
Producers,"  in Report  of  the  President  on  U.S.  Competitiveness  (Office  of  Foreign 
Economic  Research,  U.S. Department  of Labor,  September  1980). 
25. This is confirmed  in C. Michael Aho and Richard  D. Carney, "An Empirical 
Analysis  of the Structure  of U.S. Manufacturing  Trade  1964-1976,"  Economic  Discussion 
Paper  3 (Bureau  of International  Labor  Affairs,  Department  of Labor,  June  1979). 
26. See Raymond Vernon, "Gone Are the Cash Cows of Yesterday," Harvard 
Business  Review,  vol. 58 (November-December  1980),  pp. 150-55. Robert Z. Lawrence  147 
The literature  disputes the precise sources of the U.S. advantage  in 
high-technology  manufactured  goods. Does it result from the relative 
abundance  of engineers  and  scientists,  the relatively  large  amounts  spent 
on R&D, or the market  inducements  to innovate  in a rich  economy?  The 
strong interactions among these factors inhibit quantification  of the 
contribution  of each.27  However, it is possible to provide  a snapshot  of 
the kinds  of manufactured  goods the United  States succeeds in exporting 
and  those in which import  penetration  has been the greatest. 
U.S. export industries  have made  large  investments  in R&D and are 
at the technological frontier.28  The products are often novel, require 
specialized production  methods, and benefit during  their development 
from being close to the market  in which they are sold. Staying ahead 
requires  continual  innovation  to offset the inevitable  standardization  of 
the production  process and the international  diffusion of technology. 
Conversely, U.S. imports,  especially those from developing  countries, 
are by and large mature  and standardized  products  that can be mass- 
produced using skills that can be  quickly acquired. They may be 
manufactured  products requiring  unskilled  labor (such as apparel  and 
footwear) or products requiring  capital relatively intensively (such as 
steel). 
The  growing  importance  of high-technology  trade  to the United  States 
is illustrated  by figure 1, which contrasts the U.S. trade balances in 
R&D- and non-R&D-intensive  products.29  The geographic  distribution 
of the U.S. trade balances in R&D-intensive  products  corresponds  to 
the relative  stages of development  of U.S. trading  partners. 
In summary,  therefore,  the impact  of trade  has not been to shrink  the 
U.S.  manufacturing  sector, and the United States has not lost its 
comparative  advantage  in manufacturing  as a whole. The United States 
has been developing a comparative  advantage  in high-technology  (and 
resource-intensive)  products,  while its comparative  advantage  in labor- 
27. On this question, see Thomas C. Lowinger, "The Technology  Factor and the 
Export  Performance  of U.S. Manufacturing  Industries,"  Economic  Inquiry,  vol. 3 (June 
1975), pp. 221-36. 
28. The classic generalization  along  these lines is Vernon's  product-cycle  theory.  See 
Raymond  Vernon, "International  Investment  and International  Trade in the Product 
Cycle, " Quarterly Journal of Economics,  vol. 80 (May 1966), pp. 190-207. 
29. The United States has maintained  its share in world trade of high-technology 
products  far better  than in more  routine  goods. See Bela Balassa, "U.S. Export  Perfor- 
mance: A Trade Share Analysis," Working  Papers in Economics, 24 (Johns Hopkins 
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Figure 1.  U.S. Trade Balance in R&D-intensive  and Non-R&D-intensive 
Manufacturing,  1960-79a 
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Source:  National  Science  Foundation,  Science  Indicators  1980 (U.S.  Goverment  Printing Office,  1981), p. 32. 
a.  Exports  minus imports. 
intensive  and  capital-intensive  products  manufactured  with  standardized 
technologies has been eroding. There is, therefore, a correspondence 
between  the U.S. industries  experiencing  slow  economic  growth  because 
of sluggish  domestic use and those experiencing  declining  comparative 
advantage. 
The direction  of structural  change in U.S. domestic markets  and in 
U.S.  comparative advantage may well be causally linked. The shift 
toward  the demand  for high-technology  products  domestically  may be 
an important  source of the growth in comparative  advantage of the 
United States in these products;  and conversely, the shifts away from 
older  products  may  have contributed  to their  relative  decline. Burenstam 
Linder stresses the availability  of markets  and associated scale-econ- Robert Z. Lawrence  149 
omies rather  than  of factors  of production  such as capital  or labor  as the 
major  determinant  of comparative  advantage  and  suggests  that  countries 
export  goods that  are demanded  in their  home markets.30 
Structural Adjustment 
Employment shifts required  by structural  change generally can be 
easily accomplished  by the U.S. economy. If the changes  that  occurred 
in 1970-80  indicate  the magnitude  of long-run  structural  shifts, for most 
declining  industries  the annual  average  employment  drop  is rather  small. 
Taken together, employment  in low-technology industries  fell by 0.3 
percent over the decade-an  average of 0.03 percent a year, while the 
decline  from  the cyclical peak  in 1973  through  the more  slack  conditions 
in 1980  averaged  0.82 percent a year. In fact, the employment  loss due 
to structural  change  over the entire  decade  of the 1970s  was considerably 
smaller  than the drop in one year of a major  recession. For example, 
from 1973 to 1975, employment in low-technology sectors fell at an 
annual average rate of 5.3 percent, while from 1979  to 1982  the drop 
averaged  4.3 percent  a year. 
To be sure, in some industries  the pace of decline during  the decade 
was somewhat  more  rapid.  In the wood containers  and  leather  products 
industries-the sectors with the greatest  employment  loss from 1970  to 
1980-the  declines averaged  3.3 and 2.4 percent a year, respectively. 
Yet considering  the typical rate at which workers  voluntarily  quit their 
jobs, even these industries  would have been able to cope with a smooth 
declining  employment  trend without involuntary  layoffs. The problem 
is that such changes do not occur smoothly; they coincide with the 
business cycle and may take the form of lumpy plant closures rather 
than smooth exponential  decay. 
Recent Experience 
Much  of the current  concern  about  trade  in manufactured  products  in 
particular  and structural  change in general stem not from the trends of 
the 1970s,  but  from  the much  sharper  effects on manufacturing  industries 
30.  Staffan Burenstam Linder, An Essay on Trade and Transformation (John Wiley, 
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that  came  from  the strong  dollar  and  the 1980-82  recession. An intensive 
investigation  of the relative role of trade in manufacturing  and other 
factors during  this period is beyond the scope of this paper  and, in any 
case,  the data to undertake such an analysis are not yet at hand. 
Nonetheless, some observations  can be made  about  the role  of trade  and 
structural  change  in the recent developments  in manufacturing. 
A substantial  proportion  of the decline in U.S. manufacturing  em- 
ployment  from  1980  to 1982  was due  to changes  in  trade  flows,  particularly 
exports. Between these two years, the volume of U.S. manufactured 
goods exports  declined 17.5  percent.  The volume  of manufactured  goods 
imports rose 8.3 percent. As estimated above, employment due to 
manufactured  exports in 1980  was 2.93 million. Since output per em- 
ployee in manufacturing  was similar  in 1980  and 1982,  employment  and 
output  due to trade  most likely declined  proportionally.31  This suggests 
an employment  decline of 513,000  persons, or about 34 percent of the 
total 1.51 million decline in manufacturing  employment  from 1980 to 
1982,  was due to the fall in manufactured  exports. 
The  jobs lost to imports  can be estimated  on two alternative  assump- 
tions. As estimated  above, imports  were displacing  2.9 million  U.S. jobs 
in 1980.  If one assumes rising  import  volumes added  proportionately  to 
this  job displacement,  the 8.3 percent rise in import  volumes between 
1980  and 1982  displaced  an additional  240,000  U.S. jobs. Alternatively, 
if the value of U.S. demand  is assumed  to rise with domestic  prices and 
the value of U.S. production  is reduced  by an amount  equal  to the higher 
value of imports,  the estimated  job loss is negligible  since import  values 
and  domestic prices both rose by about 14  percent. 
The decline in the U.S. manufacturing  trade  balance  during  1980-82 
has  a simple  explanation:  it is primarily  the result  of the rise  in  the relative 
price of U.S. manufactured  goods associated with the real appreciation 
of the U.S. dollar.  According  to calculations  of the International  Mone- 
tary  Fund, during  this period  U.S. unit  values  for manufactured  exports 
increased by 31 percent relative to those of major  industrial  competi- 
tors.32  Although  the global  recession and  the liquidity  and  debt  problems 
31. The declines  in manufacturing  employment  and  industrial  production  from  1980  to 
1982 were  7.1  and 6.2  percent,  respectively.  See  Economic  Report  of  the President, 
February 1983, pp. 205, 210. 
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of developing countries were contributing  factors in retarding  U.S. 
export markets  toward  the end of the period, the OECD  has estimated 
that  the market  for U. S. manufactured  goods actually  increased  by about 
5.3 percent  from 1980  to 1982.33 
Much  has been made  of the structural  nature  of the unemployment  in 
U.S. manufacturing  during  1980-82.  It is commonly  argued  that  the  jobs 
lost in the current  recession in basic industries  will not be replaced  even 
if the economy recovers strongly.  But with  a return  of the exchange  rate 
to near  its 1980  level and a recovery of the economy, there is no reason 
to believe this. As I argue above, it is normal  in a recession for high- 
technology employment  to decline less rapidly  than  employment  in the 
rest of manufacturing.  From 1979  to 1982,  high-technology  employment 
fell about  3.4 percent  a year  less rapidly  than  the rest  of manufacturing- 
a differential  that was remarkably  similar  to that in 1973-75. The 1.8 
percent  differential  that  occurred  in 1980-82  was quite similar  to the 1.6 
percent  differential  for the 1970s  as a whole. 
Regressions of employment  in high- and low-technology  industries 
against  a time trend  and capacity utilization  in manufacturing  over the 
1970s indicate a slight upward  long-run  trend for low-technology em- 
ployment  of about  0.2 percent  a year  and  an increase  of about  1.8  percent 
a year for high-technology  employment.  This trend  and actual  employ- 
ment are shown in figure  2. Had capacity  utilization  been at its 1970-80 
average, employment in 1982 in high- and low-technology industries 
would  have been higher  by 260,000  and 1.5  million,  respectively.  A more 
competitive  value of the dollar  would have added still more to employ- 
ment, as already  noted. 
A return to the long-run employment trend by 1990 would entail 
average  annual  employment  gains during  1982-90  of 2.5 and 1.5  percent 
a year in high- and low-technology manufacturing,  respectively. In 
summary,  employment  in manufacturing  has fallen considerably  below 
its long-run  trend. Given reasonable  economic expansion and interna- 
tional  price  competitiveness,  structural  change  should  now be relatively 
easy to accommodate  in the remainder  of the 1980s. 
33. Organization  for Economic Cooperation  and Development, OECD Economic 
Outlook  (Paris:  OECD,  December  1982),  p. 125.  For a more  complete  analysis  of 1980-82 
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Figure 2.  Employment  in High- and Low-Technology  Manufacturing,  1968-9Oa 
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Sources:  U.S.  Bureau of Labor Statistics,  Employment and Earnings,  historical data tape; and Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve  System,  data series  on capacity  utilization in manufacturing. 
a.  Industries are divided  into  high and low technology  at their three-digit Standard Industrial Classification  level 
based on the "product-cycle"  division  in Robert M. Stern and Keith E.  Maskus,  "Determinants  of the Structure of 
U.S.  Foreign  Trade:  1958-76,"  Journal  of  International  Economics,  vol.  11 (May  1981), pp.  207-24.  I make one 
addition to  high technology:  SIC 3761, guided missiles  and space  vehicles.  To  estimate  employment  trends,  I first 
regressed  the log of employment  against a time trend and capacity  utilization  in manufacturing for  1970-80.  Then, 
in the resulting equation,  I replaced  capacity  utilization  with the average capacity  utilization for  197040  to derive 
trend employment  for  1970-90. 
Employment Growth and High Technology 
Would  the current  job losers from the low-technology  industries  be 
employable in high-technology  industry?  To some degree, those dis- 
placed  will find  employment  in other sectors of the economy. The issue 
of  structural  mismatch across manufacturing  remains, however. In 
particular,  there has been concern about the distributional  effects of Robert Z. Lawrence  153 
changes in the structure  of U.S.  manufacturing  trade.34  Some major 
characteristics  of workers in high- and low-technology industries  are 
shown in table 5. An examination  of the averages  reported  in the table 
suggests  differences  that  might  be expected:  workers  in high-technology 
industries  tend to be more highly paid, better educated, male, white, 
younger, and less unionized than their low-technology  counterparts.35 
The differences in regional location and occupation characteristics 
between high- and low-technology workers generally  are surprisingly 
small.36  This suggests that most of the workers could be employed in 
either  sector. 
The common perceptions of the structural  adjustment  problem  are 
not captured  by the aggregate  numbers  but are again  heavily influenced 
by the characteristics of a few prominent industries. Some striking 
differences  can be seen when one compares  characteristics  of the steel 
and automobile industries with those of the computer industry, as 
reported  in table 5. The greater  visibility and political influence  of the 
steel and automobile  industries  have perhaps  exaggerated  their impor- 
tance. First, these are industries  traditionally  and perhaps  anachronis- 
tically associated with industrial  prowess. Second, automobiles  in par- 
ticular  are viewed as an important  source  of employment  and  demand  in 
other  industries-for example, in 1972,  total  direct  and  indirect  employ- 
ment  relating  to U.S. motor  vehicle employment  amounted  to almost 10 
percent of total employment in U.S.  manufacturing.37  Third, these 
industries  operate  large  plants;  they are  concentrated  in specific  regions 
(in 1972, 66 percent of U.S.  automobile  employment  was in the East 
North Central  census region  and 76 percent  of steel employment  in the 
East North Central  and Middle  Atlantic  regions);  and they are heavily 
34. See Aho and Carney,  "An Empirical  Analysis  of the Structure  of U.S. Manufac- 
turing  Trade." 
35. The high-technology  products  tend to have lower ratios of physical capital  per 
employee.  This has an important  link  to the Leontief  paradox  discussed  above. 
36. Except for race. For an analysis  of the employment  effects of trade  on minorities 
see Robert  Z. Lawrence, "Minority  Employment  and U.S. Trade," in Foreign Trade 
Policy  and Black Economic  Advancement  (Joint Center for Political Studies,  1981), pp. 
49-63. 
37. Employment  in the automobile  industry  itself (SIC 371)  comprised  4.6 percent  of 
employment  in manufacturing  in 1972  (Bureau  of Labor  Statistics). Using input-output 
analysis,  I estimate  that  output  in  the  automobile  industry  indirectly  generated  employment 
in the rest of manufacturing,  and  thus  accounted  for an additional  4.9 percent. 154  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
Table 5.  Some Characteristics  of U.S. Manufacturing,  High- and Low-Technology 
Industries,  Computers, Automobiles, and the Steel Industry during the Past Two 
Decadesa 
High-  Low- 
tech-  tech- 
nology  tnology  Com-  Auto- 
Item  industry  industry  puters  mobiles  Steel 
Employees  (thousands)b  6,513.4  13,771.6  354.2  788.8  428.4 
Black employees  (percent)c  5.3  9.7  4.1  13.5  13.0 
Women employees  (percent)b  30.7  33.2  35.9  14.0  6.9 
Production workers (percent)b  62.1  74.3  40.0  72.9  77.5 
Employees  covered by collective  bargaining 
(percent)d 
All workers  38.9  49.0  11.0  72.0  77.0 
Production workers  58.2  61.5  15.0  98.0  98.0 
Median number of school  years completedc  12.5  11.6  13.7  12.1  12.0 
Median age in yearsc  38.9  40.3  32.6  39.3  43.7 
Work force  stability (percent of workers 
employed  50-52  weeks)c  76.8  70.4  79.5  70.9  77.8 
Average hourly wage  of production workers 
(dollars)b  7.62  7.12  6.73  9.85  11.84 
Average  annual compensation  of all workers 
(dollars)b  22,300  18,800  23,000  30,300  34,100 
Capital-labor ratio (dollars)b  23,700  30,790  21,600  40,200  93,400 
Labor's  share (percent)b  51.9  50.3  47.7  70.8  73.8 
Large-plant percentagee  41.4  23.6  58.5  71.5  89.4 
Concentration ratio (percent)e  42.8  36.4  44.0  82.0  45.0 
Allocation  of employment  by geographical 
census  regions  (percent)f 
Middle Atlantic  21.4  20.5  18.6  8.8  32.9 
New  England  10.0  6.6  12.1  1.2  0.4 
East North Central  28.8  24.7  4.6  65.9  42.7 
West North Central  6.2  6.0  14.0  6.7  1.3 
South  19.6  32.1  13.4  11.5  16.5 
West  14.0  10.1  37.3  6.0  6.1 
Sources:  Annual compensation,  capital-labor ratio, and share of labor are from U.S.  Bureau of the Census,  1980 
Annual Survey of Manufactures,  M80 (A5)-5 (September  1982); race,  school  years,  age, and work force stability are 
from Bureau of the Census,  1970 Census of Popilation  (U.S.  Government Printing Office,  1973); concentration  ratios 
and regional employment  are from the  Bureau of the Census,  1972 Census  of Manufactures  (GPO,  1975) and 1977 
Census  of  Manufactures  (GPO,  1981), respectively;  data on  total  employment,  women,  production  workers,  and 
average  wages  are from Bureau of  Labor  Statistics,  Employment  and Earnings,  various  issues;  union coverage  is 
from Richard B. Freeman and James L. Medoff,  "New  Estimates  of Private Sector Unionism  in the United States," 
Industrial and Labor Relations  Review,  vol.  32 (January 1979), pp.  143-74. 
n.a.  Not  available. 
a.  The  characteristics  of  high- and low-technology  industries  are based  on  a  sample  of  three-digit  1970 census 
code  industries that employed  85 percent  of the employees  in manufacturing in 1980. Employment  figures for high- 
and low-technology  industries are from total manufacturing data (see figure 2). The Standard Industrial Classification 
(SIC) codes  for computers,  automobiles,  and steel  are 3573, 371, and 3312, respectively. 
b.  In  1980. Annual compensation  includes  social  security  and benefits.  The capital-labor ratio is the gross  book 
value of depreciable  assets  divided by employment.  Labor's  share is total employee  compensation  divided by value 
added. 
c.  In  1970. To  derive  median  school  years  and  median  age  I computed  the  weighted  average  (by  number of 
employees)  of the medians of men and women  in the three-digit  1970 census-code  industries. 
d.  From surveys  of the  1968-72 period. 
e.  In 1977. The concentration  ratio is the weighted  average of the percent of output produced by the four largest 
companies  in  each  four-digit  Standard  Industrial  Classification  (SIC)  industry.  The  large-plant percentage  is  the 
percent of employees  in establishments  with  1,000 or more workers. 
f.  In 1972; Bureau of Census  regions. Robert Z. Lawrence  155 
unionized. Fourth, both employers and employees have considerable 
financial  incentives  to resist  change.  Workers  earn  large  wage premiums 
that reflect advantages  such as seniority  benefits, monopoly  rents, and 
the support  of strong unions that they would not receive if employed 
elsewhere.38  And employers  have invested unusually  large  amounts  of 
capital  per worker. 
In most of these respects  the computer  industry  is strikingly  different. 
Its work force has considerably more white, female, educated, and 
young workers;  it is much  less unionized  and is heavily concentrated  in 
the western  part  of the United States. Thus if the "structural  problem" 
of the reemployment  of U.S. labor  involves hiring  automobile  workers 
to build computers, as conventional  wisdom appears  to presume, the 
problem  appears  considerable.  If, however,  it involves  a gradual  replace- 
ment of low-technology  jobs with high-technology  jobs, it seems far 
more manageable. Considering  that in November 1982 unemployed 
workers  from  primary  metals  and  automobiles,  many  of whom  are  likely 
to be recalled, constituted, respectively, about 2.5 and 2.1 percent of 
total U.S. unemployment  (and  9.1 and 7.7 percent  of unemployment  in 
manufacturing),  the problems  for these industries,  while substantial  for 
the individuals  and firms involved, are a relatively small part of the 
overall  story of U.S. manufacturing.39 
Conclusions 
In the 1970s the share of manufacturing  employment  in total U.S. 
employment continued its secular decline as a consequence of the 
revealed  preference  of U.S. consumers  for services and the more rapid 
increase  of productivity  in the manufacturing  sector. 
Overall, U.S.  industrial  growth in the 1970s was sluggish but was 
almost  precisely  what  would  have been expected, given the slow growth 
38. Compensation  in steel and automobiles  in 1980  was 53 and 36 percent higher, 
respectively,  than  in high-technology  industries. 
39. In 1980, employment  in motor vehicles and equipment  (SIC 371) and in blast 
furnaces  and  iron  and  steel foundries  (SIC  331  and  332)  amounted  to 773,800  and  712,700, 
respectively.  Together  these industries  accounted  for about  16.2  percent  of the decline  in 
manufacturing  employment  from 1980  to 1982. 156  Brookings Papers  on Economic  Activity,  1:1983 
in GNP.40  Nonetheless, the United States did not experience absolute 
deindustrialization  in the 1970s. U.S.  employment in manufacturing 
expanded, and given the growth rate of output, investment  growth in 
manufacturing  was remarkably  rapid.  In contrast  to its decline  from  1960 
to 1973,  the share of manufacturing  in total U.S. fixed business capital 
actually  increased  from 1973  to 1980. 
The increase  in U.S. manufacturing  output  since 1973  was about  the 
same as the average of all industrial  countries, and more rapid  than in 
West  Germany,  France,  and  the  United  Kingdom.  Although  employment 
in U.S. manufacturing  grew modestly, in every other major  industrial 
market  economy it declined. In fact, in virtually  every major  manufac- 
turing  sector employment  in the United  States  grew  faster  than  in Japan. 
In contrast  to the U.S. experience,  the share  of total  investment  devoted 
to the manufacturing  sector has declined  in every major  West European 
country.  Although  U. S. labor  productivity  growth  in manufacturing  was 
not as rapid  as in other industrial  countries, U.S. productivity  levels in 
overall  manufacturing  remain  the highest  in the world. 
From 1973 to 1980, partly because of the real devaluations  of the 
dollar,  foreign trade  provided  a net addition  to output  and  jobs in U.S. 
manufacturing.  Although  employment  increases related  to trade  rarely 
exceeded 10 percent of total employment,  those increases were widely 
diffused:  of the fifty-two  1-0 industries  in this study, for example, only 
eleven experienced  employment  declines  due to trade  during  the 1973  to 
1980  period. 
The perceptions  of an absolute  decline  in the U.S. industrial  base and 
the belief that  foreign  competition  has made  a major  contribution  to that 
decline stem from the reinforcing  effects of U.S. trade and domestic 
growth  and  the nature  of adjustment  difficulties  associated  with declines 
in industries  adversely affected. The troubled  industries  are large and 
highly  unionized,  and  the average  plant  is large.  Workers  displaced  from 
several of these industries face the prospect of considerably lower 
wages. 
The U.S.  comparative  advantage  in skilled labor and standardized 
capital-intensive  products has been declining  secularly. And, because 
40. A regression  of industrial  production  on GNP and  on a time  trend  fitted  for 1960- 
73 yields a forecast of 1980  industrial  production  with great precision,  using the actual 
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of slow domestic growth,  the domestic  markets  for those products  have 
not expanded  rapidly.  But the U.S. comparative  advantage  in manufac- 
tured high-technology  products  has strengthened  while the demand  for 
high-technology  products  has grown  relatively  more  rapidly  in a climate 
of stagnation.  In general,  however, structural  change  in the U.S. econ- 
omy during  this period  arose mostly  from  domestic  factors. 
In contrast  to the performance  in the 1970s,  from 1980  to 1982  foreign 
trade  contributed  to the employment  decline  in manufacturing.  The  drop 
in employment due to exports was about a third of the total fall in 
employment  in manufacturing.  The recent developments  should  not be 
interpreted  as a sudden diminution  of U.S. comparative  advantage  in 
manufacturing,  however. Rather,  they are  the direct  consequence  of the 
substantial  erosion of the price competitiveness  of U.S. products  asso- 
ciated with the real appreciation  of the U.S. dollar.  While  employment 
in high-technology  industries has declined less rapidly than in low- 
technology industries in the current recession, the relation has been 
typical of  recession behavior. Employment in both sectors should 
increase  significantly  with recovery  from  the recession. 
APPENDIX 
Detailed Technical  Data for Estimates 
and Classification  Scheme 
The following  tables  present  estimates  and  the classification  scheme for 
changes in value added and employment  resulting  from foreign trade 
and domestic use by industry. Table A-1. Percentage  Change in Value Added Resulting from Foreign Trade 
and Domestic  Use, by the Fifty-two Input-Output  Categories 
in U.S. Manufacturing,  1970-80 and 1973-80a 
1970-80  1973-80 
Change  Change  Change  Change 
due to  due to  due to  due to 
foreign  domestic  foreign  domestic 
Category  Total  trade  use  Total  trade  uise 
13. Ordnance and accessories  -  20.7  3.0  -  23.7  -15.7  3.0  -  18.7 
14. Food and kindred products  24.3  2.0  22.3  16.5  2.4  14.1 
15. Tobacco  manufactures  5.1  5.9  -  0.7  -  3.0  4.0  -  6.9 
16. Fabrics, yarn, and thread  13.3  -1.9  15.2  10.7  -0.8  11.6 
17. Miscellaneous  textiles  43.6  3.7  39.8  12.7  3.3  9.3 
18. Apparel  24.7  -11.1  35.7  2.2  -5.9  8.2 
19. Miscellaneous  fabricated textiles  18.3  -1.9  20.2  3.5  -0.8  4.3 
20. Lumber and wood  products  28.8  0.6  28.2  12.0  4.4  7.6 
21. Wood containers  -  35.9  0.3  -36.3  -19.8  1.9  -21.6 
22. Household  furniture  26.5  0.6  25.9  -5.5  0.5  -5.9 
23. Other furniture and fixtures  47.0  -7.5  54.6  17.0  -  3.2  20.2 
24. Paper products  33.1  0.5  32.6  11.5  2.2  9.3 
25. Paperboard containers  and boxes  17.3  1.0  16.3  0.5  1.6  -  1.1 
26. Printing and publishing  32.1  0.6  31.5  15.2  0.7  14.5 
27. Chemicals and selected  chemical  products  30.5  6.8  23.8  6.7  4.8  1.9 
28. Plastics and synthetics  108.0  18.3  89.7  16.1  9.0  7.1 
29. Drugs, cleaning preparations  51.4  2.5  48.9  23.8  1.5  22.3 
30. Paints and allied products  18.2  0.8  17.4  0.7  1.0  -0.4 
31. Petroleum refining and related industries  30.0  -2.0  32.0  27.4  2.9  24.5 
32. Rubber products  27.3  -0.6  27.9  -1.6  1.6  -3.2 
33. Leather products  -19.0  -  9.3  - 9.7  -13.2  -  6.3  -  6.8 
34. Footwear  -  12.6  -  21.6  9.1  -  8.7  -  15.9  7.3 
35. Glass products  18.3  1.0  17.3  -5.0  2.6  -7.6 
36. Stone and clay  14.0  -1.6  15.5  -6.7  0.3  -7.0 
37. Iron and steel  -  6.1  -  3.4  -  2.7  -22.5  0.5  -23.0 
38. Nonferrous  metals  16.2  -0.4  16.6  -8.3  3.2  -  11.5 
39. Metal containers  -  1.5  2.4  -  3.9  -  5.7  2.8  -  8.6 
40. Heating and plumbing products  19.5  2.2  17.3  -  1.3  1.4  -  2.7 
41. Screw  machine products  13.7  -4.4  18.1  -12.0  -  1.5  -10.5 
42. Other fabricated metal products  29.7  -1.5  31.2  7.6  1.5  6.1 
43. Engines and turbines  27.2  19.1  8.1  1.4  10.0  -  8.6 
44. Farm and garden machinery  55.5  1.8  53.7  7.7  1.5  6.2 
45. Construction and mining machinery  51.3  21.5  29.8  15.6  12.4  3.2 
46. Materials handling machinery and equipment  20.2  3.9  16.3  4.8  3.3  1.6 
47. Metal working machinery and equipment  26.7  -2.6  29.2  9.5  -  1.6  11.1 
48. Special machinery  -  0.7  -  1.6  0.9  -19.2  -  0.2  -19.0 
49. General industrial machinery  30.7  1.1  29.6  9.2  1.3  7.9 
50. Miscellaneous  machinery  49.2  9.0  40.1  30.8  8.5  22.3 
51. Office, computing,  and accounting  machines  325.9  72.6  253.3  207.7  51.2  156.5 
52. Service  industry machines  40.1  8.0  32.1  -  8.0  4.2  -  12.2 
53. Electrical and industrial equipment  38.2  10.6  27.6  10.8  7.8  3.0 
54. Household  appliances  28.9  2.3  26.6  2.6  3.0  -0.4 
55. Lighting equipment  10.4  -0.9  11.3  -9.8  1.1  -10.8 
56. Radio and television  equipment  70.5  -12.5  83.0  51.8  -6.0  57.8 
57. Electrical  components  and accessories  212.5  -6.2  218.6  109.7  -3.4  113.1 
58. Miscellaneous  electrical  machinery, 
equipment,  supplies  42.4  7.2  35.2  13.0  7.6  5.3 
59. Motor vehicles  and equipment  21.6  -15.4  37.0  -24.1  -5.5  -18.6 
60. Aircraft and parts  11.1  16.9  -5.7  17.7  12.5  5.2 
61. Other transportation equipment  21.4  -  1.0  22.4  -  14.3  1.1  -  15.4 
62. Scientific instruments  66.0  -0.6  66.6  32.8  0.4  32.4 
63. Optical equipment  124.4  1.8  122.5  59.0  0.9  58.1 
64. Miscellaneous  manufacturing  19.7  -8.0  27.7  0.6  -5.7  6.3 
Sources:  Same  as table 1. 
a. See Survey  of Current  Business, vol. 59 (February  1979),  p. 54, for definitions  of the 1-0 categories  according  to 
the SIC  codes. Table A-2. Percentage Change in Employment  Resulting from Foreign Trade 
and Domestic Use, by the Fifty-two Input-Output  Categories 
in U.S. Manufacturing, 1970-80 and 1973-80a 
1970-80  1973-80 
Change  Change  Change  Change 
due to  due to  duie to  duie to 
foreign  domestic  foreign  domestic 
Category  Total  trade  use  Total  trade  use 
13. Ordnance  and accessories  -5.2  4.0  -9.2  0.9  4.0  -3.2 
14. Food and kindred  products  - 4.4  1.9  - 6.3  - 0.4  2.4  - 2.8 
15. Tobacco  manufactures  -  16.9  3.8  - 20.7  -  11.1  3.2  -  14.3 
16. Fabrics,  yarn, and thread  -  13.6  0.7  -  14.3  -  15.7  1.7  -  17.4 
17. Miscellaneous  textiles  - 8.6  5.5  -  14.1  -  14.5  4.3  - 18.8 
18. Apparel  - 9.9  - 6.3  - 3.6  -13.7  - 3.8  -10.0 
19. Miscellaneous  fabricated  textiles  8.4  -  1.6  10.0  - 7.3  - 0.4  - 6.9 
20. Lumber  and wood products  15.2  1.1  14.1  -1.4  4.8  -6.2 
21. Wood containers  - 37.9  0.3  -38.3  - 42.3  1.6  - 43.9 
22. Household  furniture  0.9  0.5  0.4  -  14.3  0.4  -  14.8 
23. Other  furniture  and fixtures  16.4  -4.5  20.9  6.0  -2.1  8.1 
24. Paper  products  1.5  1.5  0.1  1.6  2.5  -0.8 
25. Paperboard  containers  and boxes  - 8.9  1.0  - 9.9  - 8.7  1.6  -  10.3 
26. Printing  and publishing  13.4  0.4  13.0  12.7  0.6  12.1 
27. Chemicals  and selected chemical  products  6.2  4.4  1.9  14.0  5.5  8.4 
28. Plastics and synthetics  -11.9  5.4  -17.3  -15.3  5.6  -  20.9 
29. Drugs,  cleaning  preparations  22.1  1.5  20.6  17.3  1.3  16.0 
30. Paints  and allied  products  -6.9  0.4  -7.3  -5.9  0.9  -6.9 
31. Petroleum  refining  and related  industries  3.5  - 0.6  4.1  2.6  4.2  -1.6 
32. Rubber products  25.3  -0.5  25.8  5.0  1.5  3.5 
33. Leather  products  -27.8  - 6.3  - 21.6  -15.4  - 5.5  - 9.9 
34. Footwear  -27.0  -  15.9  -  11.2  -18.2  -  12.1  -  6.1 
35. Glass products  -  1.4  1.1  -2.5  -8.4  2.6  -11.0 
36. Stone and clay  4.6  -1.3  6.0  -7.1  0.3  -7.4 
37. Iron  and steel  -14.2  - 2.9  -11.2  -13.8  0.0  -13.8 
38. Nonferrous  metals  3.0  0.1  2.8  0.0  2.9  - 2.9 
39. Metal containers  -17.2  2.2  -  19.4  -  13.5  2.7  -16.2 
40. Heating  and plumbing  products  16.0  2.1  14.0  5.0  1.6  3.3 
41. Screw machine  products  - 8.7  - 3.7  - 5.0  -  10.8  -  1.5  - 9.3 
42. Other  fabricated  metal  products  10.3  -  1.1  11.4  2.3  1.7  0.6 
43. Engines  and turbines  21.8  17.8  4.0  11.2  12.3  -  1.1 
44. Farm  and garden  machinery  13.5  1.3  12.2  10.1  1.6  8.5 
45. Construction  and mining  machinery  46.2  19.9  26.2  25.5  15.4  10.1 
46. Materials  handling  machinery  and  equipment  30.8  4.7  26.1  8.4  3.5  4.8 
47. Metal  working  machinery  and equipment  17.2  -2.8  19.9  16.4  -1.5  17.9 
48. Special machinery  5.3  -  1.5  6.8  6.9  0.0  6.9 
49. General  industrial  machinery  13.4  -0.7  14.1  11.0  1.5  9.5 
50. Miscellaneous  machinery  37.3  8.0  29.2  33.7  8.7  25.0 
51. Office,  computing,  and  accounting  machines  50.1  16.1  34.0  52.1  19.3  32.8 
52. Service  industry machines  17.0  5.7  11.2  -4.9  4.5  -9.4 
53. Electrical  and industrial  equipment  10.2  7.1  3.2  5.6  7.1  -1.6 
54. Household  appliances  -11.2  2.1  -13.3  -17.5  3.0  -20.5 
55. Lighting  equipment  6.3  - 0.8  7.1  - 6.0  1.0  - 7.1 
56. Radio  and television  equipment  - 0.9  - 5.7  4.8  4.8  -1.6  6.3 
57. Electrical  components  and accessories  51.0  -7.8  58.7  34.8  -4.1  38.9 
58. Miscellaneous  electrical  machinery, 
equipment,  supplies  28.0  6.6  21.5  7.1  7.4  -0.2 
59. Motor  vehicles and equipment  -  1.3  -  11.1  9.9  -  19.2  - 6.4  -12.8 
60. Aircraft  and parts  -  1.8  12.8  -  14.6  24.3  14.6  9.7 
61. Other  transportation  equipment  3.9  -0.2  4.1  -9.0  0.8  -9.8 
62. Scientific  instruments  34.9  -  1.6  36.4  29.5  0.3  29.2 
63. Optical  equipment  24.0  0.3  23.7  13.7  0.2  13.5 
64. Miscellaneous  manufacturing  -  1.8  - 5.0  3.2  - 8.0  - 4.5  - 3.5 
Sources:  Same  as table 1. 
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to Comments 
and Discussion 
Richard N. Cooper: I read Lawrence's paper  with great interest. It is 
an extremely  useful paper  for correcting  widespread  misconceptions  in 
public  discussion of the changing  industrial  structure  of the U.S. econ- 
omy and the reasons for it. I like Lawrence's simple, comprehensible, 
almost old-fashioned direct analysis of the facts. I like it above all 
because his broad conclusions agree with my priors on the nature of 
changes in the U.S. economy and the relation  between those changes 
and foreign trade-in  particular,  the conclusion that changes in the 
composition of domestic demand are a far more important  source of 
change in the structure  of output and employment  than are changes in 
the pattern  of foreign  trade. 
The point is made most dramatically  in Lawrence's  table  A-2, which 
shows that domestic uses of output dominated  the sectoral changes in 
employment during the  1970s by  a  substantial margin. The major 
structural  changes within manufacturing  are domestic in origin, not 
foreign.  Some  changes, such  as ordnance,  reflect  sharp  shifts  in  domestic 
demand-in  that case,  government demand. Others reflect market 
changes  in techniques  of production-toward lower labor-output  ratios, 
for instance. 
It is true that cases can be found in which imports  have had a major 
depressing effect on domestic employment (apparel is the standard 
example),  although  even here changes  in techniques  of production  have 
been more important,  as testified  by the sharp  increase in value-added 
for domestic use contrasted  with a decline in employment. 
But there are many other sectors-tobacco,  miscellaneous  textiles, 
and especially aircraft, for instance-in  which the growth in foreign 
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demand has served to reduce the declines in employment  that would 
have occurred  on the basis of domestic  uses alone. 
Apart from drawing attention to this central result, I make five 
observations: two on possible extensions of the paper, two on the 
possible qualifications  to the paper, and one on a somewhat  surprising 
apparent  result  in the paper  and  the possible reason  for it. 
The possible extensions involve both time and space. The first 
suggestion  is to extend Lawrence's  analysis  backward  in time, to cover 
the 1960s. Tables 2 and 4 give glimpses of the differences  between the 
1960s  and the 1970s, and the glimpses are consistent with Lawrence's 
claim that the main  difference  between the two decades was the rate of 
growth  of overall  demand,  with little difference  in the rate at which the 
structure  of manufacturing  changed. In other words, structural change 
in U.S. manufacturing  was no greater  in the 1970s than it was in the 
1960s, once one corrects for overall demand. This is a strong and 
unconventional  conclusion if substantiated  by more detailed analysis, 
in particular  by correcting  for a change  in the exchange rate, a point to 
which I return  below. 
A second extension would compare  the results  for the United States 
with what has happened in Europe. U.S. manufacturing  employment 
rose almost  5 percent  during  the 1970s.  In sharp  contrast,  manufacturing 
employment  in the European  Community  fell by 12 percent. Does this 
difference  reflect some important  structural  difference, such as down- 
wardly  rigid  real  wages in Europe,  as Sachs suggests?  Or  is it merely  the 
result  of conjunctional  differences  at  the  beginning  and  end  of the  decade? 
Or, again, is it mainly due to changes in the real exchange rate of the 
dollar  in terms  of European  currencies? 
There are two  major events that cloud Lawrence's results. He 
acknowledges both of  them, but does  not  make much of  either. 
It  is fortuitous  that  1970  and 1980  had  roughly  the same  rates  of utilization, 
and that is helpful for comparing  those two years. By a widespread 
consensus, however, the dollar  was overvalued  in 1969  and, if anything, 
undervalued  in 1979,  years  that  would  strongly  influence  the  trade  figures 
for 1970  and 1980,  respectively. (The  Morgan  Guaranty  index of the real 
effective exchange  rate  of the dollar  shows a drop  of 19  percent  between 
1970  and 1980.)  Ideally, statements  about structural  change exclude or 
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from other factors. Many are inclined to accord little significance  to 
changes  in  currency  values, in  keeping  with  our  continuing  determination 
to approach  the U.S. economy as if it were closed, and then to make 
minor  allowance  for  net exports. I would  be inclined  to give considerable 
weight to them, weight that is reinforced  by the observation that the 
United  States  had  a tremendous  surge  of net  exports  in 1978-80,  following 
a sharp depreciation of the dollar, and that net exports in turn fell 
dramatically  in 1980-82, following a marked  appreciation  of the dollar. 
Correction  for these changes in exchange  rates might  lead Lawrence  to 
qualify  his results  somewhat;  but  it would  also suggest  that  some of what 
is attributed  to structural  factors is strongly  subject  to the influence  of 
financial  factors. 
The other major  change that took place in the 1970s  was the sharp 
increase in oil prices, especially the increase of 1974. (The increase of 
1979-80  may  not have influenced  Lawrence's  results  greatly.)  The input- 
output  coefficients  that he uses are drawn  from 1972  and therefore  date 
from before the sharp rise in oil prices. It is  not clear how these 
coefficients might have changed by the late 1970s; it depends on the 
energy-labor  and energy-capital  substitution  possibilities and the time 
period  associated with shifts to newer, energy-conserving  techniques  of 
production. Being deeply skeptical of the contention that capital and 
energy are complements, whereas labor and energy are substitutes, I 
cannot  conclude  that Lawrence's  calculations  are  biased  in any obvious 
way, except toward energy and the capital involved directly in the 
production  of energy. But  that  deserves more  attention  than  he has  given 
to it: in any case, the effects will be discovered when new input-output 
coefficients  become available. 
My final  observation  focuses on table 5 and  the problems  of aggrega- 
tion involved in studying  the influence  of technology on trade. Table 5 
shows that the employees in low-technology industries  are older and 
less well educated than those in high-technology  industries,  as is com- 
monly believed. But the differences are very small, about one year in 
each case. These figures  do not suggest  that the economy dichotomizes 
neatly into industries in which employees are the old and poorly 
educated, and those in which employees are young and well educated. 
Moreover,  they do not suggest a great  increase in structural  unemploy- 
ment as the low-technology  industries  contract  and  the high  technology 
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The greatest difference between the two categories involves the 
capital-labor  ratio, and that works in a direction that is favorable to 
growth because lower amounts of capital are apparently  required  to 
employ labor more  productively  in the high-technology  industries  than 
in the low-technology  ones. 
However, there is good reason to doubt that the broad categories 
reported  in table  5 capture  adequately  the differences  between low- and 
high-technology  activities. The data reported  for two illustrative  indus- 
tries, steel and computers,  do indeed show much  greater  differences  in 
average  age and  educational  attainment.  But they also display  some odd 
features.  Their  average  hourly  wages are respectively  above and  below 
the average  wages for the broader  categories,  and  the wage discrepancy 
between them can only be described  as huge. These wage figures,  taken 
naively, suggest  that  educational  attainment  has a negative  return  in the 
neighborhood  of the averages, or else that seniority  overwhelms edu- 
cational attainment  in determining  one's wage. The discrepancy  is so 
large  as to suggest  that  wage  differentials  in  this  instance  may  far  outweigh 
differences  in technological  prowess in determining  economic perform- 
ance. 
But the more general point concerns the ultimate arbitrariness  in- 
volved  in  classifying  industries  into  broad  categories.  Nonferrous  metals, 
for instance, are classified as resource-based,  whereas iron and steel 
together  are classified  as capital  intensive. Textiles are classified  either 
as capital  intensive  or  as labor  intensive.  Yet there  have  been  tremendous 
technical  improvements  in textile  fabrics  over the past  twenty  years  and, 
indeed, by 1980  the United States had  become a net exporter  of textiles, 
in part  on the strength  of these improvements.  At the same time, much 
of the machinery  and equipment  industry,  classified  here as high tech- 
nology, is quite traditional  both in its manufacturing  techniques  and in 
its products. In actuality,  high  technology  is potentially  spread  through 
all sectors of manufacturing-optical  fibers  as part  of the glass industry 
is an example-and  some firms  are  much  more  alert  to the potential  than 
others. I would conjecture  that high technology plays an even greater 
role in U.S. trade performance  than Lawrence's figures suggest. But 
two- or  three-digit  levels of classification  are  simply  too coarse  to capture 
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George M. von Furstenberg: Before Robert Lawrence goes into the 
postwar history of comparative advantage in the United States, he 
provides  exactly the kind  of research  data  that  sophisticated  politicians, 
trade  negotiators,  and  industry  lobbyists  could take into battle. Some of 
them  might  be disappointed  that  the numbers  do not come out quite  the 
way they had  imagined.  Lawrence  may  further  deflate  their  claims  when 
he stresses repeatedly  that the development  of the U.S. manufacturing 
sector  would  have been qualitatively  the same  without  the effects due to 
foreign  trade, so that there might  not be much  trade  to complain  about. 
Nevertheless, he reports inter alia that there was a decline of 10,000 
jobs due to trade between 1970 and 1980. This occurred despite the 
marked  improvement  in U.S. relative  price competitiveness, which he 
ascribes  to the dollar  devaluations  in 1971, 1973,  and 1978-79.  Because 
the dollar  has appreciated  sharply  in real terms since 1979,  it would be 
natural  for someone to observe, as Lawrence  does, that the rate of job 
loss due to trade  has accelerated  in the 1980s.  Politicians  generally  know 
what to make  of such presumptions  even though  economists do not. 
It would not be the fault of the provider  if factual information  were 
misused for protectionist  ends. Nevertheless, Lawrence  does compar- 
atively little to guard  against  misinterpretation  of his partial-equilibrium 
results. I therefore see my role as helping to increase the supply of 
inhibitors.  After some further  exposition I attempt  to do so by telling  a 
Stolper-Samuelson  story that may or may not fit recent external  devel- 
opments and their effects on the United States. The last step is then to 
ask how that story would be captured in Lawrence's input-output 
accounting  framework  or in the exercise with ex post data, as he calls it. 
If the story  line does not survive  this exercise and  quite  different  accents 
emerge in the retelling,  this could provide  a substantial  caution  against 
reasoning  from  ex post data  for policy purposes. 
At the simplest level of the public debate about the employment 
effects of trade,  the volume  of imports  and  exports  of the kind  that  would 
appear  under  particular  three- or four-digit  SIC codes, such as motor- 
cycles (part  of SIC code 375), is compared  with the number  of motor- 
cycles sold in the United States. If net imports  account  for 50 percent  of 
domestic sales and U.S.  manufacturers  of motorcycles employ 5,000 
persons, then 5,000 jobs are said to have been lost on account of the 
cycle trade. 
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is very much  more  sophisticated.  Within  the input-output  framework  he 
had the choice of basically two lines of approach: (1) had he been 
interested principally in what motorcycle imports (to continue the 
previous example) would do to employment  generally, he could have 
allowed  for  the fact  that  employment  is reduced  not  only in this  particular 
import-competing  industry  but also in all the industries  supplying  inputs 
to it; (2) if, alternatively,  he wished to focus not on what motorcycle 
imports  did to employment  generally  but on what imports  of manufac- 
tured  goods generally  did to employment  in the motorcycle  industry,  he 
could  proceed  differently.  Choosing  (2), he could  recognize  that  employ- 
ment lost in that industry  could be due not only to the importation  of 
motorcycles but also of goods that would have used motorcycles and 
parts  as inputs  had  they been produced  at home.  I 
Although  the first of these two approaches  could be more directly 
useful in the argumentation  of those who seek to restrict imports of 
particular  products while paying lip service to the idea of free trade 
elsewhere, the author  chose the second approach  advisedly. In doing  so 
he provided  some obstacles to abuse, but  not nearly  enough  in my view. 
After all, before all but the most alert audiences, politicians can get 
nearly  as much  mileage  from  saying  that  imports  of manufactured  goods 
cut so much employment  from the automobile  industry  as they can by 
claiming  that  automobile  imports  caused  the loss of so much  employment 
generally. Something is seriously wrong with all such claims, as the 
following  example  may show. 
Consider  the case of a country  with  a capital-intensive  export-oriented 
sector and a labor-intensive  import-competing  sector. If one assumes 
that foreign demand for the output of the capital-intensive  sector in- 
creases, the result  will be that  the relative  price  of products  of that  sector 
and of the factor used most intensively in the sector rises. Desired 
capital-to-labor  ratios  fall in both sectors, and  labor  incomes decline  not 
only relatively  but  absolutely.  The  increase  in  foreign  demand  for a home 
country's exportables will lead to an appreciation  of the domestic 
currency  in real terms. If imports  and import-competing  goods are less 
than  perfect  substitutes  in home consumption,  the decline  in the relative 
1. Although  these indirect  effects are  likely  to be unimportant  in the present  example, 
they can be quite  important  at the two-digit  level of input-output  divisions  chosen by the 
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price of imports  will reduce, but normally  not eliminate,  the fall in the 
real  consumption  wage of labor.  If the fall in the equilibrium  level of the 
real wage creates temporary  unemployment  and unacceptable  redistri- 
bution  of income, there  are  familiar  countermeasures  that  could  be taken 
without  restricting  trade. Furthermore,  the income effects arising  from 
the improvement  in the terms-of-trade  and rate-of-return  effects of the 
greater  demand  for capital  will increase  saving  and  add  to the productive 
base of the economy. In the short-run,  however, domestic use of the 
capital-intensive  product  will decline  but  by less than  the rise in exports. 
Conversely, domestic use of the labor-intensive  product  will increase 
but  by less than  the rise in imports.  Hence domestic  production  will shift 
from  labor-intensive  to capital-intensive  goods while domestic absorp- 
tion shifts in the reverse direction, with both exports and imports 
increasing.2 
How would all this be reflected after the fact in the accounting 
framework  described  earlier  in these comments?  Lawrence  would find 
that  exports  have contributed  significantly  to employment  in the capital- 
intensive sector and more than offset the decline in employment  stem- 
ming from the reduction  in domestic use which is taken as given. He 
would further  report  that employment  in the labor-intensive  sector has 
been reduced by imports  growing more than domestic use, with both 
changes  again  taken  as given rather  than  induced.  His sectoral  casuistry 
notwithstanding,  there  has been only a single  cause or shock  from  which 
all else followed in the above system: a rise in the foreign demand  for 
exportables. It appears that less  can be  learned from Lawrence's 
tabulations  than  the presentation  of his results  suggests. 
There  are  some other  difficulties  of interpretation.  For  instance,  input- 
output  analysis is not particularly  discerning  of the national  destination 
of incomes from trade. Surely it makes a difference  if exports from  the 
United States are produced  by foreign-owned  firms,  if U.S. exports are 
displaced  by the output  of U.S.-owned manufacturing  facilities  abroad, 
or if imports  to the United States are obtained  from  foreign  subsidiaries 
or branches  of U.S. corporations.  The stream  of factor-service  incomes 
2.  Under the reverse circumstances,  increases  in imports  will have both direct and 
indirect  (general  equilibrium)  effects on exports, as described  by Walter  S. Salant,  "The 
Effects of Increases  in Imports  on Domestic  Employment:  A Clarification  of Concepts," 
Special  Report 18 (Washington,  D.C.: The National  Commission  for Manpower  Policy, 
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generated  from past capital  exports has implications  for the balance  of 
trade in manufactured  goods and the interpretation  of any measured 
employment loss  that could arise from a negative balance. Mature 
creditors  are supposed  to have such balances  for international  compati- 
bility. Finally, trade  in automobiles,  shoes, steel, and textiles, to name 
but  a few, has not been free  for a long  time  and  is becoming  progressively 
more  restricted.3  Miscreants  who do not believe in exchange-rate  effects 
of trade  restrictions  in equilibrium  might  even argue  that  the reason  why 
Lawrence does not find larger  employment  losses from trade in these 
and  other  industries  is precisely  because  import  restrictions  have  worked 
so well.4 
General Discussion 
Hendrik  Houthakker  questioned  the value  of looking  only at  the effect 
of trade  on the manufacturing  sector. The  agricultural  and  service  sectors 
are  also heavily  involved  in international  trade.  For  example,  the United 
States is a major  exporter  of soybeans, both raw  beans and meal or oil. 
If soybeans are exported as meal or oil they would be included in 
Lawrence's  analysis, but otherwise they would be excluded. From the 
point of view of employment, however, the distinction  between these 
forms  is unimportant. 
Edward  Bernstein  observed  that  by simply  comparing  the increase  in 
manufactured  exports with the increase in manufactured  imports  over 
3. Net trade  restriction  in some  categories,  such  as automobiles,  is difficult  to measure 
since some countries  in this hemisphere  also restrict U.S. automobile  exports through 
domestic  value-added  or reexport  requirements  that  constrain  their  balance  of net  imports 
of automobiles  and  parts  from  the United  States. 
4.  For  recent  work  analyzing  effects on trade  in conditions  of general  equilibrium  with 
or without instant clearing in labor markets and for further  references see Andrew 
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Proposals  in the Tokyo Round and Comparisons  to More Extensive Liberalization  of 
World  Trade," Economic  Journal, vol. 90 (December  1980),  pp. 838-66; and Alan V. 
Deardorff  and  Robert  M. Stern,  "A Disaggregated  Model  of World  Production  and  Trade: 
An Estimate of the Impact of the Tokyo Round," Journal of Policy Modeling,  vol. 3 (May 
1981),  pp. 127-52. See also a survey article by John B. Shoven and John Whalley  on 
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the 1970s,  Lawrence  has ignored  the fundamental  change  in world  trade 
brought  about by higher  oil prices. The increase in oil prices induced 
OPEC  nations  to increase  enormously  their  importation  of manufactured 
goods. Industrial  countries  in  general  were  thus  compelled  to have  bigger 
increases in their manufactured  exports than in their manufactured 
imports  simply  in order  to finance  higher  energy  bills. In addition,  when 
industrial  nations  pay higher  prices  for oil, these imports  absorb  expend- 
iture  and  hold  down  demand  for manufactured  and  other  domestic  goods 
because there is no rise in domestic income to offset the rise in energy 
bills. For  these reasons,  the  overall  effect  of foreign  trade  on employment 
cannot  be inferred  by an  analysis  that  is confined  to manufactured  goods. 
Bernstein  also pointed  out that  much  of the rise and  then  decline  in U.S. 
net exports of goods and services, in constant dollars, has been attrib- 
utable to changes in factor income, such as profits  and interest earned 
on American  foreign  investments.  Although  variations  in  real  net  exports 
are  often used in explaining  domestic  developments,  fluctuations  arising 
from factor income are largely irrelevant  in assessing the net effect of 
trade  on U.S. employment. 
Houthakker  also wanted  to know  more  about  income  and  substitution 
effects, which  are  crucial  for  extrapolating  trends  in manufacturing  trade 
into the future.  He emphasized  the need to account  for the effects of the 
dollar devaluations and revaluations on foreign demands for U.S. 
exports. This is especially important  in the near term because of the 
recent great strengthening  of the dollar  which, by many measures, has 
carried  the dollar  exchange  rate  above  its level in 1970.  Bernstein  argued, 
however, that  the big drop  in U.S. manufacturing  exports since 1981  has 
been due to the severe world recession. The recession has affected  the 
United States more seriously than Europe  because a larger  fraction  of 
U.S.  exports is bought by the developing countries that are most 
adversely  affected  by the downturn. 
C. Fred Bergsten questioned  Bernstein's  interpretation  of the effect 
of the world recession. Although  world demand  for U.S. exports has 
fallen, the domestic recession has reduced U.S.  demand for foreign 
goods at the same time. He concluded  that, on balance, the net impact 
of the recession has not been large  either in helping  or hurting  the U.S. 
trade balance. Bergsten also suggested that the impact of trade on 
employment  during  certain  subperiods  of the past  decade  was especially 
instructive. During 1978-80, U.S. exports grew at double the rate of Robert Z. Lawrence  171 
world trade generally and actually recaptured  all the share of world 
exports of manufactured  goods that the United States had  lost after  the 
late 1960s. The chief reason for this return  to competitiveness  was the 
elimination  of the dollar overvaluation  of the preceding  period. U.S. 
experience  during  1978-80  provides  a powerful  rebuttal  to the view that 
the nation  is being deindustrialized  due to a fundamental  loss of ability 
to compete. 